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Abstract
The quality  of education  is a determining factor  in a  lives, teachers in basic public  schools are better  paid than
nation's competitiveness.  To compete globally, Mexico  in other comparable  groups.  She also finds that some
needs to raise  its education  standards. Several  incentives  for teachers at the school  level improve
innovations  to raise the quality  of basic education  at the  learning achievement.  For instance,  the  enrollment of
federal and state levels have been developed:  teachers  in the Carrera  Magisterial  program has  a positive
professional  training  of teachers,  new "learning presence  effect on students'  learning achievement.  Furthermore,
in schools,"  and improvement  of working conditions and  teachers'  training is most effective  when targeted  toward
salaries of teachers.  L6pez-Acevedo  examines teachers'  increasing  their practical experience  and developing
incentives and their impact on students'  learning  content-specific  knowledge.
achievement.  She shows that early in their professional
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21.  INTRODUCTION
Although  one  of the  major  education  policy  goals  of  many  Latin  American
countries,  including  Mexico,  is  to  achieve  universal  basic  education,  and  there  has  been
tremendous progress toward this goal, school quality is still a major concern.  School quality
has  not  kept  pace  with  enrollment  increases,  and  an  increasing  number  of  children,
especially  poor children  and those  living in rural  areas  are being  educated  in low quality
schools.  As  a result  there  is  grade  repetition  and  low  academic  achievement  (OREALC
1998).
In  spite  of the  relative  growth  in  research  literature  on the  differential  effect  of
education  inputs on  student  achievement,  the  results  have  been  a  matter  of considerable
debate.  While  in  developed  countries  education  inputs  seem  more  important  than
socioeconomic origin to explain achievement,  in developing  countries the contrary  seems to
be the case -family background  is more important than school and teacher characteristics in
explaining  achievement.  In  spite  of  some  inconsistencies,  the  literature  for  developing
countries indicates that education inputs have a significant effect on academic  achievement
(Lockheed  and  Verspoor  1991;  Schmelkes  and Tepepa  1999).  Most of these  studies focus
mainly  on  material  inputs  and  largely  exclude  education  process  indicators.  Teaching
methods,  classroom  and  school  management,  and  the  involvement  of the  principal  have
generally not been researched  (Martin 2000.).
Undoubtedly, at the core of an effective learning process  in school is a good teacher
(Flyer and Rosen  1997;  Ruiz  1999).  How they teach  and motivate  students and what they
teach  them lies at the heart of the  learning  production  process.  Students  learn better when
they  are taught  by teachers  who teach  clearly;  that is,  teachers  who  can  explain concepts
3clearly, who have  a good working  knowledge of their subject matter, and who are  able to
answer students'  questions intelligently (Galchus  1994).
In general, the literature  reviewed finds that the factors, which have been identified
in  international  studies  regarding  basic  education  teacher  effectiveness,  are  for the most
part absent  from  Mexican  classrooms  (Schmelkes  2000).  Teachers  do  not make  detailed
lesson  plans;  higher  order thinking  is not  stimulated;  reading  comprehension  and writing
abilities  are  not  adequately  taught;  there  is  very  little  cooperative  learning  and
individualized  attention; time is not used optimally;  and the teachers  are very much left to
their own devises  and receive  little academic  support from their superiors (though support
from fellow teachers seems to be more common).  In Mexico teachers  in many schools are
also  said  to  suffer  from  a lack  of collegial  work,  school  support  for  effective  teaching,
feedback,  and  accountability.  These  are  key  factors  and  their  importance  on  school
effectiveness  has been underlined  by local and international research.  Part of the reason for
this  deficiency  is that informal  rules governing  schools  leave teachers  very much on their
own in the classroom.  On the one hand,  there is little  control of what goes on inside.  On
the other  hand, teachers  get very little  classroom support.  They receive very little support
from the principal, who is afraid to intrude into a space that is virtually considered to be the
teacher's  sacred  domain.  Supervisors  rarely  visit  schools,  and when they  do  they  hardly
ever  visit  classrooms  or  make  pedagogical  recommendations.  In-service  training
opportunities  are scarce,  particularly  in rural  areas.  Although most teachers say they read,
what they read rarely relates to pedagogical issues (Schmelkes  1997; World Bank 2000).
Schmelkes'  (1997)  vivid  description  of classroom  teaching  practices  and  teacher
quality  in  one  state  of Mexico,  Puebla,  is  illustrative  of the  perception  of  observers
regarding what often goes on in Mexican classrooms.  She writes:
4Teachers  do  not  always  master  their  subject  matter.  It  cannot  be  assumed  that  a
teaching  certificate  is  a  guarantee  that  the  teacher  has  the  required  knowledge  of all the
primary  school  learning  objectives.  Teachers  in  general  are  not  adequately  trained  in
effective  teaching practices.  The predominant  teaching  model  is  centered  on the  teacher,
geared towards the class as a whole, based solely on the textbook as a source of information
and practice,  and aided  by the blackboard  as  the sole teaching  aid.  It is obvious  from this
study that teachers  in general  have few ideas  on how to  deal with a multi-grade  situation
and few seek to promote  pupil participation.  Still fewer are those who know how to handle
special  learning  difficulties.  Group  work  by  pupils  is  very  rare.  The  exploration  of
community  resources  as  learning  material  and  as  a  source  of educational  experience  is
almost completely  absent. Pupils'  learning experiences  are monotonous, and mainly consist
in reading from the textbook and copying in the notebook or doing exercises dictated by the
teacher.  Importance  is hardly ever attached by teachers to reasoning,  problem-solving,  and
the application of knowledge to everyday life situations.
In  pursuing  the  long-term  goal  of improving  students'  learning  achievement  in
Mexico, this paper examines  teachers'  incentives  and professional  development  in schools
in  Mexico.  Such  incentives  include  non-monetary  benefits  offered  to  teachers  such  as
extrinsic  motivators  and  also  monetary  benefits.  Direct  monetary  benefits  include  salary
and  allowance  offered  to  teachers.  Indirect  monetary  benefits  include  all other  resources
provided  to  teachers.  Measures  of professional  support  include  training,  teacher's  guides,
didactic  material,  instructional  supervision,  and  monetary  incentives.  Non-monetary
incentives refer to parents  and students'  perception of the teacher's  work, choice of location
for a teacher's and next assignment (type of post).
5This  paper  is  divided  into the  following  sections:  Section  2  briefly  describes  the
current structure of the education system in Mexico.  Section 3 describes the data used in the
analysis.  Section 4 examines whether teachers are underpaid in Mexico.  Section 5 measures
the impact of school factors on students' performance.  Section 6 offers  conclusions.
2.  BACKGROUND
Within the Mexican education system,  basic education is the government's  highest
priority.  The  basic  education  system  consists  of:  (a)  early  childhood  education  (or  pre-
school),  which  is  optional  for  children  from  3 to  5 years  old;  (b)  mandatory  primary
education,  ideally for children  aged 6 to  12, but due to late enrollment  and grade repetition
it is targeted at children aged 6 to 14;  and (c) mandatory lower-secondary school education,
consisting of a 3-year cycle, and intended for children aged  12 to 16.
The Mexican government is the predominant provider of basic educational  services.
It owns  about 91  percent of primary  and secondary  schools,  which account  for 90 percent
of the  enrollment.I  At university  level,  however,  the  private  sector  plays  a much  bigger
role.  It accounts for close to half of the enrollment (46 percent).  The educational  system in
Mexico  is now  so  extensive  that there  are  over  483,000  schools  (excluding  pre-school)
staffed by over a million teachers,  of which 84.3 percent are from public schools.  Teachers
represent  2.8 percent of the full time labor force  from which only 20.1  percent  are private
school teachers.
In  1999, the public  school teacher's  share was 42.82 percent of the total number  of
government  personnel.2 All  teachers  in  public  basic  education  are  affiliated  with  the
The  share  of public  school  enrollment  is  about  94  percent  (primary),  93  percent (lower-secondary),  and  78 percent
(upper-secondary).
2  Federal, state, plus autonomous  school teachers.
6National  Union  of  Workers  in  Education  (Sindicato  Nacional  de  Trabajadores  de  la
Educaci6n,  SNTE).  All teachers  in upper-secondary and tertiary education have a union of
professors  and  administrative  workers  also  affiliated  with  SNTE  or  are  independent
(autonomous  or state Universities).
The Mexican  educational  system has  become  highly centralized in the hands of the
Federal  Government.  This  centralization  is  reflected  by  the  growing  share  of  federal
schools  in total enrollment,  which  rose from  64 percent  in 1970  to 72  percent  in  1990. In
May  1992, however,  the states, the federal  government structures,  and the SNTE signed the
National Agreement  for the Modernization  of Basic Education (Acuerdo Nacional  para  la
Modernizaci6n de la Educaci6n Basica, ANMEB). This agreement was created in response
to  demand  for  a decentralized  educational  system.  This  agreement  should allow  states to
have  more  participation.  Previous  attempts  to  decentralize  the  educational  system  have
failed  due  to  constraints  on the  state  and  federal  government  structures  and to  opposition
from the SNTE.  The ANMEB  is part of a long process that yielded satisfactory  results until
May 1992, when the Federal  Government,  State Governors, federal agencies,  and the SNTE
signed the agreement (Secretaria  de Educaci6n Publica,  SEP,  1998).
This  program  had  three  main  objectives.  The  first  was  associated  with  the
reorganization  of the educational  system,  which consisted in the  transfer of the Education
Sector,  formerly  administered  by  the  Federal  Government,  to  the  States.  The  transfer
included  513,974  teachers,  116,054  administrative  posts,  3,954,000  hourly-salaries,  1.8
million pre-school  students,  9.2 million  primary  students,  2.4  million  secondary  students,
and 22 million different materials.
The  second  objective  was  the  reformulation  of regional  educational  content,  in
which  states  received  the  authority  and  the  right  to  propose  changes.  Proposals  are
7evaluated  by the  SEP  and,  if accepted,  they  are  included  in the  Free  Textbook  system
(Sistema Nacional de Libro de  Texto Gratuito). In this respect,  the role of the states is to
propose content, while the federal government decides and puts the proposal into practice.
The  last objective,  the revaluation of teaching  activities,  consisted in launching the
Carrera  Magisterial, for teachers  of basic education  and  members of the Union.  Overall,
the  objective  was  to  improve  teachers'  welfare  through  better  salaries  and  housing
policies.3, 4 In  this  context,  the  federal  government  modified  its  educational  discourse,
placing more emphasis on the quality of educative content instead of the previous focus on
educational  coverage.
The creation of the Carrera  Magisterial  in 1992 as part of the ANMEB  was aimed
at  raising  the  quality  of basic  education  through  teachers'  professional  training,  a  new
learning presence  in schools, and by improving working conditions.  One component of this
program  is the training of teachers; another is a merit payment system in which professional
staff are voluntarily  evaluated  and rewarded  with salary increases  for their performance  as
classroom teachers,  school directors-supervisors  and administrators  (tecnico-pedag6gicas).
The  evaluation  is  based  on  experience  (10  points),  professional  skills  (28  points),
educational  school  level  (15 points),  and completion  of accredited  courses  (17  points).  In
the  case  of teachers'  performance  in  school,  30  points  are  given  to  student's  learning
achievement and professional performance.
3The appendix reviews the educational  decentralization  process in Mexico.
4 The ANMEB  aimed at reorganizing the educational  system through a process  of administrative decentralization,  as well
as  a  revision  of the  basic  educational  program  and  the  production  of adequate  textbooks.  In  accordance  with  this
agreement,  the Federal  Government  transferred  the  control  and management  of the basic  education  schools  to the  state
governments.  The  1992  agreement  carried  with  it  only  a  very  limited  idea  of  decentralization.  Still,  the  Federal
Government  remains  responsible  for general  policies and  standards (normative  and  policy-making  functions),  teachers'
formation and allocation,  textbook production, evaluation  and monitoring,  and the provision of financial  resources needed
to  ensure  proper  coverage  and  quality  of the  educational  system.  Moreover,  Federal  education  transfers  to  the  states
remain earmarked for specific purposes.  In 1998 the government passed the 1998  Law on Fiscal  Coordination, which gave
the states greater discretion in the use of Federal  education  and other transfers.
8As with principals and supervisors,  30  points are  given to school  performance  and
professional  achievement.  Teachers in the third area (tercera  vertiente) obtain 30 points for
educational  support.  All the teachers  in any one of the following modalities  are considered
as  candidates  for the  program:  initial  education,  basic  education,  indigenous  schools,  and
lower-secondary  education  via  television  (telesecundaria).  There  are  five  levels  of
promotion  ("A", "B",  "C",  "D",  "E").  The  salary  rewards  allocated  to  each  represent  a
salary increase but do not represent a change in the type of post assigned to the teacher. The
amount  assigned  to  each  of these  levels  is  a  considerable  increase  with  respect  to  the
number  of  hours  worked  in  the  initial  post.  According  to  the  General  Direction  of
Evaluation  (SEP),  21  percent  of a  teacher's  total  salary  at  Level  "A"  comes  from  the
Carrera  Magisterial program.  The  Carrera Magisterial contributes  38,  51,  61,  and  68
percent  to  a teacher  at  Level  "B,"  "C,"  "D,"  or  "E,"  respectively.  The  promotion  ladder
attaches considerable  importance  to seniority within this program,  posts or teaching jobs  in
under-developed  areas.  Once teachers  get the Carrera  Magisterial  benefit,  it is extremely
rare  that  they  lose  it.  If teachers  retire,  they  cannot  be  promoted  within  the  Carrera
Magisterial  unless assigned to administrative tasks (tecnico-pedag6gicas).
93. DATA
This  paper  uses  two  sources  of information.  In  section  4,  we  use  the  National
Household  Income and Expenditures  Survey  (Encuesta Nacional  de Ingresos  y Gastos  de
los  Hogares,  ENIGH)  collected  by  the  National  Institute  of Statistics,  Geography,  and
Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,  Geografia e Informatica,  INEGI) to examine
if teachers  are underpaid.  The ENIGH survey is representative  at the national level, in both
urban  and  rural  areas.  The  survey design  was  stratified,  multistaged,  and  clustered.  The
final  sampling  unit  is  the  household  and  all  the  members  within  the  household  were
interviewed.  In  each  stage,  the  selection  probability  was  proportional  to  the  size  of the
sampling  unit.  Thus,  it is  necessary  to have  the  use  of weights 5 in  order to  get suitable
estimators.  The  ENIGH  survey  identifies  important  socioeconomic  variables  such  as
educational  attainment, personal  income, and number of hours worked per week by family
member.  Total  income  is  aggregated  into  seven  broad  categories:  i)  labor  earnings;  ii)
income  from  self-employment;  iii)  property  income  and  rents;  iv) monetary  transfers;  v)
other  current  income;  vi)  monetary  and  non-monetary  financial  income;  and  vii)  non-
monetary income such as imputed rent, in-kind transfers,  gifts, and auto-consumption.
In section 5, we use the Primary Education Assessment  Survey,  second round 1997
(Encuesta de Evaluaci6n de  Educaci6n Primaria  [EEEP],  segundo levantamiento  1997)
from  the  SEP  to  measure  the  effect  of school  factors  on  a student's  perfornance.6 The
General  Directorate  for Evaluation  (Direcci6n  General  de  Evaluaci6n  -DGE)  in SEP  has
collected important information on standardized students'  tests in the  1997-2000 period; the
s The weights  should  be  calculated  according  to the  survey  design  and  corresponds  to  the  inverse  of the  probability
inclusion.
6  Until  recently,  the  lack  of public  access  to  students'  tests  had  weakened  transparency  and  accountability  of  the
educational  system,  and deprived SEP and other education stakeholders of information that could be analyzed to improve
the system and shape policy at different levels.
101997 is used in this paper. The EEEP survey is representative by state level and by stratum
(urban  -public  and  private  - schools,  public  rural  schools,  indigenous  schools,  and
community  schools).  Students were  given standardized  achievement tests  at the beginning
of sixth  grade  that  covered  the  subjects  studied  in  the  fifth  grade.  EEEP  also  collected
information  on  schools,  parents,  teachers,  supervisors,  and  socioeconomic  and  academic
backgrounds.  Non-categorical  variables include  students'  scores, age,  amenities or facilities
in the  house, the number of rooms in the house,  the number of teachers'  updating courses,
didactic  material  available  to  the  teacher,  and  school  equipment.  The  survey  design  is a
two-stage  stratified probabilistic sampling,  proportional  to the size. The first stage involves
randomly  selecting  the  schools  in each  strata  (CC=Cursos  Comunitarios;  EI=Indigeneous
Education;  RP=Rural  Public;  UP=  Urban  Public;  UPV=  Urban  Private)  and  the  second
stage  is the selection  of students.  The sample  included  53,209  students and  3,645  schools
(see  Annex A).  In matching  students  with their parents,  close to  15 percent of the sample
was lost because  their parents  did not respond to the questionnaire.  Another  30 percent of
the  sample  was  also  lost  when  matching  students  with  their  corresponding  fifth  grade
teachers.  Thus,  sample weights were re-estimated accordingly.7
4. ARE TEACHERS'  UNDERPAID?
Teacher  salaries  have  often  been  highlighted  as  a  very  important  issue  in
discussions on school improvement  (Mitchell  and Peters  1988;  Komenan  1990;  Cox  1993;
Chapman  1993;  Lankford  and  Wyckoff  1997;  Liang  1999).  The  level  and  structure  of
teacher remuneration  is said to affect their morale  and their ability  to focus on and devote
7  Further,  the distribution  of the test scores  of those students that were matched successfully suggests  that there was no
truncation  in the final sample.
11adequate time to teaching well. It could also determine the capacity of the education system
to  attract  and  retain  good  teachers  (Popkewitz  and  Lind  1989;  Psacharopoulos  and
Valenzuela  1996).  This section explores  if teachers  are underpaid.  Workers  in the ENIGH
were  classified  into  four  occupational  groups:  teachers  in  basic  public  schools  (which
includes  teachers  in  primary  public  schools  as  well  as  teachers  in  secondary  public
schools),  teachers  in  basic  private  schools  (which  includes  teachers  in  primary  private
schools  as well as teachers in secondary private schools), other government workers (which
contains  all  the  other  occupational  public  groups,  excepting  teachers,  with  12  years  of
formal schooling or more),  and private sector workers  (workers in the private sector, except
for  the  agricultural  group  workers  and the  low-skilled  group  workers,  with  12  years  of
formal  schooling  or more).  These two latter groups  were chosen in  order to provide  close
comparison.  Separate ordinary  least squares  regressions were computed for both groups  of
teachers  and  for  the  comparable  groups.  The  analysis  uses  hourly  labor  earnings  as  the
dependent  variable  and  years  of  schooling,  gender,  region  (urban-rural),  experience
(defined  as  age-years  of schooling-6),  and  experience  squared  as  explanatory  variables.
Estimates  are presented in the following table.
12Table 1.  Determinants of Hourly Labor Earnings
Teacher in basic  Teacher in basic  Other government  Private sector
Public schools  Private schools  Workers  Workers
Years of schooling  0.058  *  0.030  0.128  *  0.168  *
(3.464)  (0.998)  (9.245)  (13.518)
Gender (Male=l)  0.083  0.397  *  0.038  0.230  *
(1.191)  (2.249)  (0.546)  (3.564)
Experience  0.033  *  0.113  0.083  *  0.049  *
(2.705)  (1.312)  (5.039)  (5.483)
Squared experience  -0.0004  *  -0.002  -0.002  *  -0.001  *
(-1.976)  (-0.996)  (-3.708)  (-2.59)
Region (Urban=l)  -0.1233  Dropped  0.051  0.452  *
(-1.561)  (0.278)  (4.873)
Constant  1.2715  *  0.709  -0.561  *  -1.543  *
(3.831)  (0.812)  (-2.049)  (-7.349)
Source: Author's estimates based on ENIGH  survey.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
T-stat in parenthesis.
These  results  indicate  how  returns  to  different  factors  vary  among  all  four
occupational  groups.  Teachers  in  basic  public  schools  have  lower  returns  to  years  of
schooling  than  other  government  workers  or private  sector  workers-while  basic  public
teachers have  a return of 5.8 percent  for an additional year of schooling, the private  sector
workers  and the other  government  workers have  returns  of 16.8 percent and  12.8 percent,
respectively.  Differences  between  urban  and  rural  areas  might  be  a key  issue  from  the
social point of view.  As  one can see  in the  table  above,  the public  sector does not face  a
regional  discriminatory  problem,  because  public  employees  in  rural  areas  earn  similar
wages to  those  in  urban  areas.  Nonetheless,  a private  sector  worker  in urban  areas  earns
45.2 percent more than a private sector worker in rural areas.
Another advantage  of running separate  regressions is that differences  in the earning
gradients  can be  estimated  over the  life  cycle  of teachers  (public  and  private)  versus  the
other occupational  groups.  Additionally,  earnings variation  over life  cycle by occupational
groups can be evaluated to analyze whether labor earnings dispersion is low or high. Figure
1 shows income profiles for teachers in basic public and private schools, other government
13workers,  and  workers  in  the  private  sector.  This  graph  assumes  a  constant  level  of
schooling (15 years), male and urban workers.
Figure 1
Earnings Profile for Teachers and Other Comparable Groups
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Teachers in basic private schools face the most uncertainty about  lifetime salary and
job tenure.  Nevertheless,  they earn  more than public  school  teachers  and the other  groups.
Teachers'  labor earnings  in basic public school  profiles are slightly flatter than the  income
profile  for the private  sector  workers. At the  initial  stage of their professional  life, teachers
are paid  about 79 percent more  per hour than private  sector  workers,  and about 77 percent
more than other government workers.  However,  as can be seen in Figure  1, public teachers'
earnings  grow at a slower rate than in comparable  occupations.  Note that other government
14workers'  wages  grow  at  a  significantly  higher rate  than  public  teachers'  salaries.  Other
government workers  face significant risk throughout their professional  life, possibly due to
the uncertainty of obtaining  retirement  benefits  and the  lack of a civil  service career in the
public  sector.  Nevertheless,  the  public  teachers'  union  has  been  effective  in  stabilizing
teachers'  jobs and salaries.  Once a public  school teacher enters the labor market, the union
not only protects his or her position, but also protects his or her lifetime income.
5.  THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL FACTORS  ON STUDENTS'  PERFORMANCE
Mexican  education  literature  is rich  in  ethnographic  studies  of schools  in  various
parts  of  the  country  (Tirado  1999;  Martin  2000).  In  contrast,  there  are  hardly  any
econometric  studies  that  quantify  the  effects  of  school  factors  or  teaching  practices  on
student  learning.  There  are  some  econometric  studies,  among  others  World  Bank  (1999)
and World  Bank (2000),  but they are  also  limited to a few states.  This  section presents  a
national/urban/rural  and  public/private  analysis  of  the  EEEP  measuring  students'
performance.  The purpose here  is to test certain hypotheses  regarding  the  determinants  of
student  learning.  These  hypotheses  relate  to  the  effects  of school  quality,  particularly
teachers'  income,  experience,  training,  teaching  practices,  and teachers'  incentives  at the
school  level.  Issues  regarding  supervision,  facilities,  and  specific  students'  characteristics
and their parents' are also considered in the analysis.
Based on the EEEP, Table 2 shows the distribution of the Spanish and Mathematics
test  scores  by school  quintiles.  The best  20 percent  schools  in the nation have  a score  of
57.7 on average  in Mathematics (out of 100 points) and a relatively higher score in Spanish.
The  standard  deviation  is  higher  in  this  group  compared  to  the  rest  of the  learning
achievement  quintiles.  The  highest  grade  dispersions  are  concentrated  at  the  tails  of the
15distribution.
Table 2.  Fifth Grade Test Score  by Learning Achievement  Quintile
Quintile  Mathematics  Spanish
Mean  SD  Mean  SD
1  40.7  2.9  46.5  2.7
2  45.6  0.8  51.5  1.0
3  48.4  0.7  54.5  0.7
4  51.5  1.0  57.8  1.3
5  57.7  4.2  65.5  5.0
Total  48.7  6.1  54.9  6.8
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round  1997.
Table  3 shows  the distribution  of test scores  nationwide  by stratum.  Private urban
schools  perform  relatively  better  than  other  types  of schools.  Public  urban  schools  rank
second  while  indigenous  schools  are  at  the  bottom  of the  distribution.  Nonetheless,  the
grade  differences  between  indigenous  schools  and  community  schools  are  small,
particularly in Spanish scores.  The highest dispersion of test scores  is found in the learning
of Spanish scores in private urban schools.
Table 3.  Test Scores  b  Stratum
Mathematics  Spanish
Stratum  Mean  SD  Mean  SD
Community  School  47.3  5.7  52.0  5.2
Indigenous School  45.8  5.4  51.5  5.1
Public rural school  48.2  6.0  54.0  6.2
Public urban  school  49.4  5.9  55.6  6.3
Private urban school  53.0  6.5  62.9  8.4
National  48.7  6.1  54.9  6.8
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round 1997
Table  4  shows  classroom  size  by  stratum,  which  can  be  taken  as  a measure  of
relative school productivity  among stratum. Surprisingly,  indigenous schools perform better
in this indicator than community  schools given that the scoring difference  between them is
not significant.  However, classroom size does not differ  significantly between private urban
schools and public urban schools although variance is greater in the latter.
16Table 4.  Classroom Size by  Stratum
Stratum  Mean  SD
Community  School  23.0  1.2
Indigenous School  22.5  8.0
Public rural school  21.5  7.1
Public urban  school  24.6  3.5
Private  urban school  24.3  4.5
National  22.6  6.6
Source: Primary Education Assessment  Survey,  second round  1997.
Tables  5 and  6  below  show  the  distribution  of students  by  learning  achievement
quintiles.  About  45  percent  of students  in  private  urban  schools  are  enrolled  in  the  top
quintile of schools, compared  to only 6.4 percent  of the  students from indigenous  schools,
which  has  the  highest  percent  of  students  enrolled  in  the  bottom  quintile  of Mexican
schools. These results are more pronounced  in Spanish, since 61.4 percent  of the students in
private urban  schools  are enrolled  in the best 20 percent  of schools,  compared  to only 4.0
percent  of the  students  from  indigenous  schools,  which  also  have  the  highest  percent  of
students enrolled in the lowest 20 percent.
The  distribution  of students enrolled  in public  urban  schools  is  evenly  distributed
across quintiles.  The  distribution  of students  in  public  rural  schools  is  biased toward  the
lowest quintile.
Table 5.  Fifth Grade Students Share by Mathematics Test Scores Quintiles within Stratum
Stratum  Quintile  I  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5  Total
Community School  26.0  23.4  20.2  18.2  12.2  100.0
Indigenous  School  33.2  26.9  20.1  13.4  6.4  100.0
Public rural school  22.5  21.4  20.1  19.1  16.9  100.0
Public urban school  15.7  18.5  20.6  23.9  21.3  100.0
Private  urban school  6.4  10.2  13.6  24.4  45.3  100.0
Source: Primary  Education Assessment Survey,  second  round  1997.
17Table 6.  Fifth Grade Students Share by Spanish Scores Quintile within Stratum
Stratum  Quintile I  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5  Total
Community School  30.7  30.5  17.7  15.2  5.9  100.0
Indigenous School  34.8  28.8  16.7  15.7  4.0  100.0
Public  rural school  22.5  24.9  18.9  20.8  12.9  100.0
Public urban school  15.4  20.8  17.5  25.6  20.8  100.0
Private urban school  4.9  6.9  6.9  19.9  61.4  100.0
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey,  second round  1997.
Which  primary  school  characteristics  contribute  the  most to student  learning  in  a
multivariate  model?  How  do  these  school  variables  have  an  effect  on  learning
achievement?  The  models  below  attempt  to  answer  these  questions.  In each  model,  the
school,  socioeconomic  characteristics,  and  teachers'  characteristics  are  the  same.8 This
chosen  estimation  strategy  allows  us  to  measure  the  effect  of these  factors  on  learning
achievement  The first model presented is the variance plus school fixed model. This model
fully captures  school  effects  through  the  use  of a complete  set  of school  dummies.  The
second  model  uses  school  variables  (instead  of dummies)  to  analyze  the  determinants  of
school factors on learning achievement. Denoting child and household level variables by X,
school dummies by D, and school variables by W, the models  are:
Model  1 (with school dummies):  yi = j'Xi  +  8'DA  +  Es
Model 2 (with school variables):  yj =  ,'X 1 +  8'W.  +  Ej
The  two models  are estimated  separately  for the urban  and rural  areas  as  well  as
nationally.  This  attribute  enables  us  to  estimate  the  overall  mean  of achievement,  and
determine  the  deviations  of the  students'  scores  and of the  school's  averages  around that
8 Annex B has the full description of the variables  used in the analysis.
18mean.  The  second  model  fully  captures  the  students'  effects  through  adding  students'
socioeconomic  variables to the empty model.
The third model uses school's  level variables to analyze  the determinants of school
effects  on  learning  achievement.  The  fourth  model  drops the  dummy  variables  from  the
third model and is estimated by ordinary least squares.9
Y  =  X/3  +  Za  + d171 +  d  + ... + dkyk  + E
where,
Y  Vector of individual  student test scores, Mathematics  or Spanish
X  Matrix of student's socioeconomic  background variables
Z  Matrix of teacher's  and school's variables
d,  The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample
£  Vector of residual terms [ E(£) = 0  and  E(EE ) = 0°.
9  The last result is not shown  here but available upon request.
19(1)  Model 1 (fixed effects model).  The model is described  by the following equation,
Yjj  = 700 + d171 + d2Y2 +.  + dkrk +
where,
Y ,j  Vector of individual student test scores, mathematics.
yOO  Overall mean of achievement.
di  The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample.
Yk  The deviations of achievement of the "k" school around the overall average.
£ ij  The deviations of students'  scores around the overall average.
Table 7  shows the estimates of the first model for public/private schools at national
level,  as well as for urban and rural areas.  It can be seen in this table that the variation in
mathematics  test scores has an important  school effect  in urban/rural  areas.  At the national
level,  the  total  students'  scores  variance  is  48.35,  of which  51  percent  of the  variance
component ratio is attributed to school-level effects.
Table 7.  The Empty Model Public and Private Schools
Public Schools  Public and Private Schools
National  Urban  Rural  National
Total students' scores variance  48.35  56.26  46.67  48.99
Variance within the schools  23.82  24.67  23.15  24.08
Variance between the schools  24.54  31.59  23.52  24.90
Variance component ratio of school effect  0.51  0.56  0.50  0.51
Number of students  19,419  11,256  8,163  23,955
Number of schools  1,586  744  842  1,909
Source: Author's estimates using the Primary Education  Assessment,  second round 1997,  SEP.
20(2)  Model 2 with school dummies and students' characteristics:
In  order to  have  greater precision  in the  estimation  of the  students'  effects  on the
learning  achievement,  several  relevant  variables  were  introduced  at  the  student  level,
including  student's  gender,  age,  pre-school  education,  repetition  of fifth  grade,  teacher's
performance,  student's  attitude  toward  learning,  household  size,  household's  income,
household  utilities,  number  of books  in  house,  number  of  rooms  in  house,  parent's
schooling  level,  parent's  expectations  of  the  student's  educational  achievement,  and
parent's  opinion  of  educational  services  in  the  school.  The  variables  were  entered
individually to test whether the  coefficients  remained robust and significant.  The model  is
described by the following equation:
Y,j  =Yo +Y  fhXq, +dly, +±d 2 Y 2 +...  +dkYk  + ,J
where,
Y,  Vector of individual student test scores,  Mathematics.
,00  Overall mean of achievement.
Bh  Vector of parameters to estimate;  1, .., H.
Xi/  Matrix of student's socioeconomic background variables.
dk  The dummy variables that indicate schools  in the sample.
7k  The deviations of achievement of the "k"  school  around the overall  average
conditioned on students'  characteristics.
£ jj  The deviations  of students scores around the overall average.
21Table 8.  Model  2. Students' Characteristics
National  Urban  Rural
Coeff.  S.E.  Level  Coeff  S.E.  Level  Coeff.  S.E.  Level
_________________________________  ~of  Sig.  of Sig,  of Sig.
Student's gender (male)  0.211  0.309  0.495  0.985  0.489  0.044  0.034  0.503  0.946
Student's age  -0.358  0.150  0.017  -0.484  0.179  0.007  -0.204  0.224  0.363
Pre-school education  (yes)  -0.069  0.279  0.805  -0.046  0.455  0.919  -0.259  0.434  0.551
Repetition in 5th grade  (yes)  -0.652  0.323  0.044  -0.204  0.370  0.581  -0.743  0.430  0.084
Blurred vision (yes)  -1.281  0.366  0.000  -1.301  0.560  0.020  -1.286  0.580  0.027
Teacher's  performance  0.244  0.070  0.000  0.382  0.084  0.000  0.227  0.107  0.034
Student's attitude towards learning  -0.111  0.063  0.079  -0.105  0.076  0.166  -0.101  0.103  0.326
Household income  0.152  0.054  0.005  0.135  0.053  0.012  0.115  0.089  0.194
House  services  0.023  0.017  0.188  0.023  0.022  0.296  -0.002  0.027  0.944
Father's schooling level  0.105  0.073  0.151  0.097  0.067  0.144  0.210  0.099  0.034
Mother's schooling level  0.121  0.065  0.062  0.127  0.065  0.052  0.081  0.111  0.466
Educational services  in school  0.309  0.101  0.002  0.265  0.110  0.016  0.288  0.167  0.085
Constant  50.832  2.948  0.000  48.597  3.872  0.000  53.011  4.893  0.000
Total Variance  34.958  39.105  39.228
Variance within the schools  23.408  23.479  22.563
Variance among the schools  11.550  15.626  16.665
Variance component ratio of school effect  0.330  0.400  0.425
R-squared (explained variance)  0.277  0.305  0.159
Students'  R-squared  (explained variance)  0.017  0.048  0.025
Schools'  R-squared (explained variance)  0.529  0.505  0.291
Number of Students  13,439  7,721  5,718
Number of Schools  1,553  740  813
Source: Author's estimates using the Primary Education Assessment,  second round 1997,  SEP.
The  advantage  of this  model  is  that  it  provides  extensive  information  about  the
sources  of  variation  that  constitute  the  R-squared.  At  the  national  level,  the  student
socioeconomic  variables explain 27.7 percent of the total variation.  This is understandable,
because  almost  all  explanatory  variables  are  categorical.  Notice  that  this  set  of
socioeconomic  student  variables  explains  more  than  52  percent  of the variation  among
schools  but  only  explains  1.7  percent  of the  students'  variance.  In  urban  areas,  the
explanatory  power of the  socioeconomic  variables  is similar  to that of the  national  level.
The  introduction  of these  variables  has  several  effects.  It  reduces  in absolute  terms  the
variance  among  schools  (from 24.54 in  model  1 to  11.55  in model  2)  because  individuals
are  less  heterogeneous.  The  variance  component  ratio  of school  effect  from  model  1 to
model  2  dropped  by  18  percent  percent,  implying  that  the variance  component  ratio  of
22student  effect  increased  by  69  percent.  Thus,  schools  appear  to  be  more  similar
(homogenous)  taking into consideration students'  characteristics,  but the differences  among
schools (heterogeneity)  remain relatively  important.  The explanatory  power of the student
variables  is much  lower for rural areas  than for urban areas.  These variables  explain only
29.1  percent of the total school variance and 2.5  percent of the student variance.
This  analysis  also  weighed  student  socioeconomic  profile.  Males  and  females
achieve  equally  in  mathematics.  Age  and  grade  repetition  have  a  significantly  negative
impact  on  mathematics  achievement.  These  students  achieve  lower  grades  than  others.
Repetition  has  been  associated  with  low  achievement  and  school  dropout  (Schmelkes
1997).  Pre-primary  school  level  is  not  significant  for  mathematics  test  scores,  possibly
because  parents  infrequently  participate  in  their  children's  learning  achievement.
Additional  work  is  needed  to  establish  the  links  between  initial  education,  parents'
participation, and learning achievement. Nonetheless, the results show that the development
of self-driven and studious students who seek information beyond textbooks  is a key factor
in  increased  learning  achievement.  How  to  develop  good  learning  habits  and  motivation
among students should be a challenge not only to teachers but also to parents.
Teacher's  pedagogical  behavior  (efforts  and performance  in  the  classroom)  is  of
great  importance  in  grading  learning  achievement.  The  impact  of this  variable  is  much
greater than  the  impact  of other  school  factors,  such as  didactic  material  available  to  the
teacher.  Students  learn better when they are taught  by teachers  who  teach clearly (that  is,
explain concepts  clearly),  who have a thorough  knowledge of the subject matter,  and who
are  able  to  handle  students'  questions  and  doubts  intelligently  (Ruiz  1999;  Santos  1999;
Schmelkes  1997, 2000).
23Students  in  households  with  higher  per  capita  income  or  family  assets  achieve
higher  scores.  In  addition,  there  is  a  strong  positive  relationship  between  a  mother's
schooling  level  and  children's  learning  achievement  in  urban  areas  and,  conversely,  a
father's  schooling  level  and student  achievement  in rural  areas.  This  finding is consistent
with  Tirado  (1990).  It  was  also  found  that  the  quality  of educational  services  has  a
considerable positive impact on learning achievement.
(3)  Model 3 (with student's socioeconomic index, and  school and  dummy variables).
Conditioned on the socioeconomic  student's profile, the model below estimates the
impact  of  school  variables  on  student  achievement  scores.  Accordingly,  model  3  is
described by the following equation:
Yj;  =7yoo +±  I, +aan,Zi +d1 y-1 +d2 Y2 +-.+dkYk  +Sj
where,
Yij  Vector of individual student test scores, mathematics.
y00  Overall mean of achievement.
B  Parameter to estimate
am  Vector of parameters to estimate;  1, ... , M.
i,  Vector of student's socioeconomic  index.
Z j  Matrix of schools variables.
dk  The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample.
E ii  The deviations of students'  scores around the overall average.
24Table  9 presents  an estimation  of model 3 at the national  level. Table B. 1 presents
the  estimations  for  rural  and  urban  areas.  As  in  model  2,  the  variables  were  entered
individually to test whether the coefficients remained robust.
Table 9. Determinants of Mathematics  Achievement  Scores in Fifth Grade at National Level
Public and Private Schools  Public Schools
Coeff.  Level  of  Elasticity  Coeff.  Level of  Elasticity Sig.  Sg
Student Socioeconomic  Variables  0.485  0.000  0.485  0.000
Teacher's  gender (male)  -0.675  0.023  -0.0072  -0.916  0.015  -0.0103
Teacher's  age  0.190  0.095  0.0183  0.280  0.070  0.0270
Attendance  to updating courses (yes)  -0.931  0.074  -0.0171  0.416  0.476  0.0077
Teacher's residence within the community (yes)  -0.052  0.890  -0.0004  -0.102  0.801  -0.0008
Teacher's years of residence  in the community  0.240  0.027  0.0261  0.135  0.261  0.0148
Teacher's schooling level  0.139  0.294  0.0103  0.219  0.183  0.0163
Teacher's  pedagogical  behavior  0.053  0.034  0.0052  0.194  0.015  0.0041
Teacher's interest  in students'  learning  0.288  0.023  0.0098  0.092  0.003  0.0031
Number of updating courses  0.028  0.584  0.0030  0.021  0.709  0.0023
Type of post.  Short term (yes)  -1.210  0.030  -0.0013  -1.177  0.014  -0.0013
More than one post (yes)  -0.004  0.990  0.0000  0.304  0.395  0.0014
Teacher's  income  0.135  0.225  0.0097  0.094  0.475  0.0069
Didactic material available  to the teacher  0.011  0.608  0.0033  -0.004  0.878  -0.0011
Number of supervisor visits  5.523  0.000  0.0754  5.484  0.000  0.0780
Teacher's  enrollment in Carrera  Magisterial (yes)  1.436  0.003  0.0187
Carrera Magisterial  level  -0.413  0.056  -0.0072
Correction for possible self-selection  bias in Carrera  1.674  0.182
Magisterial
Constant  45.854  0.000  44.873  0.000
RA2  0.388  0.377
Number of Students  14847  13,767
Number of Schools  1718  1602
Source: Author's estimates using the Primary Education  Assessment,  second round  1997, SEP.
In general,  students with teachers who have more years of experience  (using age  as
a  proxy)  achieve  higher  scores  in  mathematics.  It  is  clear  that  teacher  experience  and
seniority improve  student achievement  growth rates,  suggesting  that teacher proficiency  is
enhanced  by practical  experience  and training.  The marginal  productivity of time  spent  in
formal education of teachers on teacher effectiveness  is statistically insignificant.  However,
the potential of training  to contribute  to the improvement  of teaching  effectiveness  appears
25to  be  high.  The  following  findings  show:  the  importance  of teachers'  experience  and
practice; teacher ability to deal with children's questions and doubts intelligently (implying
the  importance  of teachers'  subject  matter  knowledge),  and  teacher  effectiveness  in
monitoring students' performance or difficulties and talking to students.
Female teachers increase  learning achievement.  Interestingly, training (measured by
the  number  of courses  taken  by  the  teacher)  has  not  influenced  student  achievement.
Moreover,  each  one  of these  courses  separately  failed  to  have  an  impact  on  learning
achievement.  Thus,  investment  in  primary  school  teachers  seems  most  effective  when
targeted toward increasing practical experience  and developing content-specific knowledge.
Teacher's  years  of residence  in  the  community  increases  students'  achievement,
possibly  because  of the teacher's  involvement  with  the  community.  Type  of post  (short
term) has a negative impact on learning achievement.  Teacher's  years of schooling failed to
demonstrate  significant  effects  on student  learning,  which is expected  since there  is  little
variance  in the level of schooling.  A teacher's income has no significant effect on learning
achievement,  but many  studies  have  found  that teacher's  salary  is a poor predictor  of a
student's achievement  (Figlio 1997; Martin 2000).
Frontline  educators feel that problems relating to school infrastructure  and facilities
negatively  affect  teaching  effectiveness  and  student  learning  achievement  (World  Bank
1999  and  2000).  Their foremost recommendation  for raising  school  quality  is to address
this inadequacy.  To what extent this recommendation  will actually lead to student learning
achievement  is questionable.  Some  studies  in other  countries  show that  improvement  in
school  infrastructure  can have a significant positive  impact on student learning.  However,
the EEEP data do not appear to support this hypothesis.
26Teacher's  pedagogical  efforts  show  a positive  and  significant  marginal  effect  on
learning  achievement.  Pedagogical  effort  and  teacher  answers  to  student  questions  are
highly correlated  with greater learning achievement.  Other work or secondary  activity does
not  affect  a student's test scores,  possibly  because  only  a small proportion  of fifth grade
teachers have  a secondary occupation.  A large number of public school teachers,  however,
have  two  or more posts.  As part of ANMEB,  teachers  have  at  least two posts,  one  at the
primary  school  level  and another  at the  lower-secondary  school  level.  Didactic  materials
available to the teacher failed to demonstrate a significant effect on learning achievement.
An  additional  important variable to  explain learning  achievement  in public schools
was school  supervision by the principal  and supervisor.  The  frequency  of school  visits by
supervisors  has  a  significant  and  positive  correlation  with  student  learning.  Students  in
schools with a high degree of supervision  on the part of the school principal achieve better
scores.  Thus,  differences  in  school  organization  and management  could be  important  for
student achievement.  It is also  consistent  with the  PARE  experience,  which indicates that
the  quality  of supervisors  and  the  frequency  of their  school  visits  had  significant  and
positive effects  on student test scores (World  Bank 1998). The type of post assigned to the
teacher  (short  term)  has  a  negative  impact  on  learning  achievement  (mathematics  test
scores), particularly in urban areas.
Additionally,  the  impacts  of each  explanatory  variable  in  elasticity  terms  were
computed  in order to compare  the quantitative  effects  among  all  explanatory variables.  As
can  be  seen  in Table  9,  variables  with  the  highest  elasticity  values  include  supervision,
teacher's enrollment in the Carrera  Magisterial, and teacher's interest in students'  learning.
It  is  possible  that  there  is  a  Carrera Magisterial self-selection  problem.  The
relationship  observed between a student's learning and his or her teacher being in a Carrera
27Magisterial  may occur because of the self-selection  problem. That is, teachers who join the
Carrera  Magisterial  are likely to see themselves as highly effective  teachers and are likely
to be so, and so they have a high probability of being rewarded.  In order to avoid a possible
self-selection  problem,  the  standard  Heckman's  Methodology  was  applied to  the  Carrera
Magisterial  self-selection  problem.  The probit equation for computing the Mill's ratio was
specified as follows:
Defining  vj=l  if the  jth  teacher  is  in  Carrera  Magisterial  and  vj=O  otherwise.
Geographical  variables  as  state  and  stratum,  as  well  as  classroom  size,  teacher's
characteristics,  and  school's  characteristics  explain  this  probability.  "Teacher's  opinion
about Carrera  Magisterial  program"  is proposed  as  the trigger variable  for measuring  the
differences  in  the  application  of  this  program,  which  might  affect  the  probability  of
participation.  The probit estimation results are shown in A.3.  Selectivity  bias turned  out to
be significant only in urban areas.
Results from the  multivariate  regression model show that at the national  level  and
particularly  in rural  areas,  enrollment  in the Carrera  Magisterial has a positive  impact  on
learning  achievement.  Note  that  being  in  the  Carrera  Magisterial program  increases  a
student's  achievement  in  mathematics  by  1.87  percent  (3.31  percent  in  rural areas-see
Table  B. 1).  However,  the  level  in  Carrera Magisterial is  negatively  correlated  with
learning  achievement.  Ultimately,  the  program  may  have  good  components  that promote
better teaching  practices,  but there  is  a  pervasive  incentive  affecting  teacher  promotion.
Results  show that a large  share of teachers  in basic education  is relatively old and  work in
administrative  tasks.
Furthermore,  the EEEP data show that 62.8 percent of the teachers in the sample are
enrolled  in the  Carrera  Magisterial. In addition,  there  is no  significant  difference  in  test
28score distribution between  students with a teacher in the Carrera  Magisterial  and students
without such a teacher.
Table  10. Teachers' Share in Carrera Magisterial in Fifth Grade
Carrera Magisterial  Number of Teachers  Share
Yes  2420  62.8
Not  1139  29.6
No answer  292  7.6
Total  3851  100.0
Source: Primary Education Assessment  Survey,  second round.  1997
Non-weighted data.
Tables  11  and 12 present the distribution of test scores for those students who have
a teacher  enrolled  in Carrera Magisterial  and those with a teacher  not enrolled  in Carrera
Magisterial,  nationally and  by stratum.  Since  there  is no significant  difference,  one might
infer that  there  is  no selection  bias  with teachers  in  Carrera Magisterial  getting the  best
students and other teachers getting worse students.
Table 11.  Test Scores of Students with a Teacher in Carrera Magisterial
Number of students in the sample  Test Scores
Share of students with  Mathematics  Spanish
Number  Share  Identified Teachers  Mean  Median  SD  Mean  Median  SD
In Carrera  Magisterial  19029  35.8  70.9  49.0  48.6  6.1  55.1  54.4  6.3
Not in Carrera  Magisterial  7804  14.7  29.1  48.5  47.8  6.5  55.1  54.1  7.4
Not Identified*  26376  49.6  48.6  48.1  6.0  54.8  54.1  6.8
Total  53209  100.0  100.0
Source: Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round  1997.
* "Not Identified" refers to those teachers who could not be matched to their respective  students.
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Teacher is enrolled in  Teacher is not enrolled  Teacher
Stratum  Carrera Magisterial  In Carrera Magisterial  not identified
Community School  Mean  47.3
Median  47.2
SD  5.7
Indigenous School  Mean  45.6  45.7  46.0
Median  45.5  45.5  46.3
SD  5.4  5.6  5.3
Public rural school  Mean  48.4  47.9  48.1
Median  47.8  47.8  47.8
SD  6.2  6.2  5.8
Public urban school  Mean  49.7  49.9  49.0
Median  49.2  49.2  49.2
SD  5.9  6.9  5.6
Source: Primary Education Assessment  Survey, second round  1997.
* "Teacher not identified" refers to those teachers who could not be matched to their respective  students.
Students  in rural schools with a teacher in the Carrera  Magisterial  achieve  slightly
better  scores  than  their peers  (Table  12).  In public  urban  schools,  there  is no  significant
difference,  but  in  the  case  of indigenous  schools  there  is  a  significant  difference.  Few
teachers  in  private  urban  schools  report  being  enrolled  in  the  Carrera  Magisterial.  This
could be a result of a sampling error, or because a teacher works at both public and private
schools.
305. CONCLUSIONS
Several interesting findings arose in this paper. First, real salaries and labor earnings
for teachers  in basic public  education are  significantly above  those from other occupations
and groups.  Secondly,  teachers  in basic public schools  face a lower risk and uncertainty of
having their standard of living  reduced (measured  as  labor income).  In other words,  once
teachers  enter the labor market  as public  school teachers the union not only protects their
position  but  also  protects  their  flow  of income  throughout  their  lifetime.  Thus,  salary
increases  for public  school  teachers  is not  likely  to be  a crucial  factor  on recruiting  and
retaining better teachers in the public schools.
The  second  part  of this  paper  analyzes  the  determinants  of  students'  learning
achievement.  Using  multivariate  analyses  the  results  show  that  student  socioeconomic
variables  explain  27.7 percent  of the  total  scores'  variation.  Whereas  this  set of variables
explains  more than 52 percent of the variation among  schools,  it explains  only  1.7 percent
of the  student-level variation.  On the  one  hand,  for urban  areas,  the power of explanation
for these variables  is similar  to the power  for national  level  areas.  On the other hand, the
predictive power of these variables  is much lower for rural  areas. The school level variation
in  the  outcome  scores  reflects  the  socioeconomic  student  variables  to  a  great  extent.
However,  some  of the  remaining  within-school  variation  might  be  explained  by  other
explanatory  variables.  Another  remarkable  result  is that although the inclusion  of student
variables  significantly reduces  the  variance  component  ratio  of schools, this ratio remains
relatively important.
On the part of the  school,  the  models estimated  consistently  showed that teacher's
and  supervisor's  variables  are  important  in  explaining  students'  learning  achievement.  It
was  found  that  a teacher's  type  of post  (short  term)  has  a negative  impact  on  learning
31achievement. Therefore,  a review of the rules for defining this kind of post needs to be done
in order to provide the right signals  to the short-term teachers. Teacher's  years of schooling
and income  failed  to  demonstrate  significant  effects  on student learning.  On  the  contrary,
teacher's  pedagogical  efforts  show a positive  and  significant  marginal  effect  on learning
achievement.  Pedagogical  effort  and  teacher  answers  to  student  questions  are  highly
correlated  with greater  learning  achievement.  Didactic materials  available  to  the teachers
and  school  facilities  failed  to  demonstrate  a  significant  effect  on  learning  achievement.
Students  in  schools  with a high degree  of supervision  on the part of the school  principal
achieve better scores.
Indicators  of organizational  and management  differences among  schools need to be
implemented  in order to evaluate how the organization  of these schools (with a high degree
of supervision)  affects  student achievement.  Teacher  training,  as measured  by the number
of courses taken by the teacher, does not have  a significant impact on student achievement.
Moreover,  each  one  of these  courses  separately  failed  to  have  an  impact  on  learning
achievement.  Thus, investment in primary school teachers seems  most effective  when it is
targeted to increasing practical experience and developing content-specific  knowledge.
Finally,  teacher  enrollment  in  the  Carrera Magisterial program  had  a  positive
relation  with learning  achievement.  The  bottom line  here  is  that  this  incentive  program
might  have  some  good  aspects  that  could  possibly  promote  better  teaching  practices.
However,  a complete  assessment of Carrera Magisterial  should not be  made only  on the
basis  of whether  it helps  to  pay the good  teachers  better  and to  retain them, but also  on
whether it pushes bad teachers to improve.  Testing this assessment will require a data panel
of teachers,  linking  teachers'  pay  to the  rate  of growth  (not the  level)  in their  students'
grades in standardized tests.
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35APPENDIX
The National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education
The decentralization process  intended to create a state agency that would receive all
the  federal  resources.  In  previous  attempts  to  decentralize  the  educational  system,  the
Federal  Government, through the SEP, established  state delegations  that were in charge of
some administrative  functions.  These  units were  in charge  of the reception of the federal
educational  system.  Gradually  the  delegations  gained  new  responsibilities  and
administrative  power that facilitated the negotiation  of the ANMEB  with the states  and the
SNTE.  These  delegations  created  a  new political  setting  where  state  union leaders  and
teachers  started to  gain power  and,  as a result of political negotiations,  many new parties
were allowed to enter. This participation and the internal struggles  in the  SNTE weakened
the rigid structure that had opposed the previous decentralization  programs.  Each state had
a different situation before and after the agreement,  as we can see in the next table:
BEFORE  THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT  AFTER THE  NATIONAL AGREEMENT
AGUASCALIENTES  AGUASCALIENTES
CAMPECHE  CAMPECHE
GUERRERO  GUERRERO  CREATION  OF A
HIDALGO  HIDALGO  DECENTRALIZED
MORELOS  INEXISTENT  STATE  MORELOS  STATE ORGANISM
OAXACA  SYSTEM  OR HIGHLY  OAXACA  (Institute)
QUERETARO  UNDERDEVELOPED  QUERETARO
QUINTANA  ROO  QUINTANA  ROD
TAMAULIPAS  TAMAULIPAS





CHIHUAHUA  COEXISTENCE  OF  CHIHUAHUA
DURANGO  ORGANISMS  WtTH  DURANGO  COEXISTENCE  OF THE
GUANAJUATO  THE DOMINANCE  OF THE  GUANAJUATO  MINISTRY AND  THE
NAYARIT  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  NAYARIT  DECENTRALIZED  ORGANISM
PUEBLA  PUEBLA  (With dominance of the




YUCATAN  IYUCATAN  I  I  Fusion
BAJA  CAUFORNIA  BAJA  CALIFORNIA  [  COXISTENCE  OF THE
JALISCO  COEXISTENCE  WITH  JALISCO  MINISTRY AND A
MEXICO  AN  EQUAUZED  STATUS  MEXICO  DECENTRALIZED  ORGANISM
NUEVO  LEON  NUEVO  LEON  l  VMth  dominance of the
SINALOA  SINALOA  Institute over the Ministry)
VERACRUZ  IVERACRUZ  I  Fusion
This table  shows that the states  responded  in different  ways to the decentralization
process, making  it either easier  or harder, depending  on their  abilities to absorb  their new
functions  and  responsibilities.  The  coexistence  of different  agencies  makes  the  process
harder  because  sometimes  teachers  belong  to  different  sections  of the  SNTE,  and  each
section  struggles  to  control  the  teaching  posts  in  the  new  state  educational  agencies.
Another  problem  was  the  standardization  of  social  benefits,  because  the  differences
36between the states and federal levels made it almost impossible for the government to cover
these differences.  The delegation  and reception of responsibilities were as follows:
Responsibilities  of the Federal  Govemment after the ANMEB
*  Operative:  Provide educational services in the Federal District.
*  Normative:  Elaborate the legal framework that rules the basic educational  system.
*  Administrative:  Transfer of the basic educational system to the states and setting up the
agreements.
*  Financial:  Provide  compensatory expenditures  (the latter through federal agencies such
as CONAFE)  to the most underdeveloped  regions to eliminate inequities between states
and regions.
*  Evaluative: Establish the evaluation procedures  for the national educational  system.
*  Formulative:  Plan  the  educational  system,  authorize,  and periodically  review  the free
textbooks.
*  Financial:  Allocate fiscal resources among the states through federal transfers.
*  Precautionary:  Supervise  the  proper  use  of the  resources  allocated  to  the  states  in
cooperation with state agencies.
Responsibilities  of the State Governments  after the ANMEB
*  Operative:  Directly provide the educational service.
*  Normative:  Guarantee  labor  rights  and social  benefits  to  the transferred  workers.  To
issue state educational  laws.
*  Administrative:  Create  public  organisms  for  receiving  the  transferred  system  and
integrate both systems into a single agency. Establish agreements.
*  Financial:  Allocate increasing resources in real terms to basic education.
*  Evaluative: Design a state evaluation system.
*  Formulative:  Propose regional contents for the programs in basic education.
Responsibilities  for Municipalities  after ANMEB
*  Operative:  Promote and provide educational  services within territories.
*  Administrative:  Establish agreements  to coordinate or unify educational services.
*  Financial:  Provide resources for school maintenance and equipment.
TAX COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION  OF FUNDS
In order to maintain the states'  new responsibilities  conceming the administration of
the  educational  system,  it was  necessary  to  complement  the  ANMEB  with a transfer  of
resources  that could  make  those  objectives  feasible.  Despite  its strategic  importance,  the
transfer of resources has not always been clear and has had different impacts on each state.
Certain  states  complain  because  they  contribute  more  to  the  federal  govemment
than  they  receive  from  it.  Furthermore,  the  levels  of  government  also  include
municipalities,  which  have  different  attributes  and  obligations,  making  it  difficult  to
establish rights on the use and collection of taxes.
37In Mexico, the tax collection scheme follows these rules:
The federal government is solely  responsible for the collection  of the following  taxes:
ISR (Tax  on  rents);  Tax  on  assets;  IVA  (Tax  on  consumption);  IEPS  (Special  taxes  on
production and services), and taxes on exports and imports.
The States are responsible for the collection  of:
Taxes  on the use of vehicles;  Taxes  on patrimonial  transference  (inheritances);  Taxes  on
notaries and judicial  business;  Taxes  on Transactions  not subject to IVA; Taxes on public
shows; and, Taxes on payrolls.
Municipalities are responsible for the collection  of:
Prevail  (a property  tax)  and Taxes  on public  services  (garbage  collection,  sewage,  water,
etc.).
The Law of Fiscal Coordination, in which the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
(SHCP) establishes  the attributions  of each  Ministry of the Federal  Government,  rules the
collection  of these  taxes.  This law  also  determines  the  allocation  criteria  for the Federal
Taxes,  establishing that 20 percent  of the  Participatory Fund  (created by the collection  of
federal  taxes)  goes  to the  States under  the  name  of Federal Participation  to  States.  This
participation  is the main source  of income  for the  States  from which they fund their own
expenditure  including  expenditures  on education.  Thus,  State Expenditures  on Education
are  financed  by  the  resources  that  each  State  receives  from the  federal  taxes  in form  of




The  decentralization  process  meant  that  both  levels  of  government  (state  and
federal)  had to be responsible  for the educational  financing.  This meant that states had to
increase  the use  of their own resources  because  their expenditure  was much  smaller  than
the Federal  expenditures.  However,  the proportions that the two levels  of government had
to  contribute  for  financing  education  were  undefined.  As a result  state  governments  have
increased  state  expenditures  on  education  to  different  degrees.  Another  problem  is  that
states  do not have  a clear and consistent classification  of the funds they use  on education.
There is  also  insufficient  information  about  state  spending  at  each  level.  Although some
states have increased  their expenditures  on education, most expenditures  go on the payroll,
and there are  still many states that have not increased  their own participation,  depending to
a  greater  extent  on  the  federal  transfers  and  participation.  If decentralization  increases,
states would be able to spend more money on specific programs to increase the quality and
coverage of education, depending to a lesser extent on the Federal  Government.
Federal  Expenditure
The  organization  and  administration  of  federal  expenditures  on  education  has
changed recently,  as a result of the  1998 reforms in the Law of Fiscal  Coordination.  In this
reform,  Ramo 33 was created to complement the new official  policy for a new federalism.
Starting  from the assumption that the State Government  is more efficient in the provision of
38some  services  (including  educational  services  and  the  importance  of  improving  the
provision  of these  services),  the  SHCP  organized  a new  scheme  on  how to  finance  these
sectors.
Before the reform,  the Federal Government channeled  the resources for education to
the states through  Ramo  25  (Contributions  to  Basic  Education)  and Ramo  26 (Previsions
for  Salaries).  Ramo  11  is the channel to transfer funds for the maintenance of the SEP and
has  not  been  changed.  With  the  creation  of Ramo  33  in  1998,  federal  expenditure  on
education  became  part of a package  of resources  intended for  education,  health  services,
and infrastructure.
Reform and  Allocation Criteria
The  1998 reform established  new funds under Ramo  33 that worked as  institutional
transfer channels.  These funds are:
Basic  Education  Contributions  Fund;  Health  Service  Fund;  Social  Infrastructure
Fund; Fund for the Strengthening of the Municipalities;  and Multiple Contributions Fund.
The  Basic  Education  Contribution  Fund  (Ramo  33)  now  includes  Ramo  25  and
Ramo 26.  Since the resources  are labeled, they cannot be used  for any other purposes than
education.  This is one of the main features  of the reform:  it gives  the states more power to
supervise  the  use  of resources.  According  to  the  Project  of Expenditures  Budget  of the
SHCP,  at  present,  the  states'  legislatures  have  the  responsibility  of  supervising  the
pertinence,  efficiency  and  transparency  of the  use  of  education  resources.  The  Basic
Education Contributions Fund, (FAEB) is negotiated annually by each state with the SEP.
The basis for these negotiations  has two criteria:
*  Irreducible  Expenditure:  This  part  is  based  on the  number  of students,  teachers,  and
schools  that  each  state  has  at the  beginning  of an  academic  year.  According  to  this
number, the SEP allocates a certain amount that can maintain the functions of the whole
state  educational  system including  some resources  for  general  services,  materials,  and
personnel services.
*  New  necessities:  Toward  the  end  of the  academic  year,  each  state  negotiates  more
funding  with  the  SEP  in order  to  cover  the  new necessities  created  by  an  increased
demand for educational  services  or by the increased  offer of teachers for the  following
academic  year.  Here,  states  can  ask  for  more  resources  if they  want  to  implement  a
specific  program.  Only  states that satisfy SEP criteria for the  creation of new locations
will  receive the necessary  increment  of resources.  These  criteria are  established in the
Booklet  of Detailed  Programming  (Manual de Programaci6n  Detallada) for  the pre-
school, primary, and lower-secondary levels.
After receiving  each  state's  proposal,  the  SEP  analyzes  the  increment  viability  in
federal transfers  for  education,  then sends  its Expenditure  Budget Proposal  to the  SHCP,
which is the last opportunity for government denial or approval.
There  are some resources that might be used for education but are not part of Ramo
33.  These  resources  are classified  under different  items and most are still administered  by
the federal government:
1.  The  Fund  for  the  Administrator  Committee  of  the  Federal  Program  of  Schools
Construction (CAPFCE).
2.  The National Council for Educational Promotion (CONAFE).
393.  Compensatory Resources under programs such as PARE, PRODEI, etc.
4.  Resources from other agencies such as SEDESOL and DIF.
In the case of the CAPFCE, a new process of decentralization  has been taking place
since  1998.  The committee  has been transferring  funds to  states and municipalities  so that
they can be responsible  for the  construction,  rehabilitation,  and maintenance of schools  in
pre-school  and  lower-secondary.  State  governments  are  already  responsible  for primary
schools, and the idea is that they will eventually be responsible for all levels of education.
The decentralization  process  is far from complete,  since  there  are  states  with two
organisms  taking care  of the educational  system with duplicity of functions.  This  situation
implies a fiscal cost that is beyond the scope of this study, but which future research should
analyze.  To  facilitate  the  administration  and  provision  of  the  services  as  well  as  the
gathering  of educational  statistics  and the integration  of policies, it would  be preferable  to
have  a single  agency to direct the educational  system.  Just  one agency  in each  state could
make  the  educational  supervision an easier  task as  long as the functions  of this  organism
are well  defined.  The  efficiency of this  organism  largely  depends  on an adequate  use  of
resources.  The latest reforms in the allocation of funds tend to prevent their misallocation,
which themselves are not sufficient.
It  is also important  for states to be  able to  raise funds  from  other  sources  (private
investments  or  savings)  generated  from  the correct  administration  of funds.  If states  are
largely dependant on resources transferred by the federal government,  it is harder for them
to  allocate  resources  to areas  or programs, which are  different to the  payroll.  States must
avoid  this  situation  so  as  to  be  able  to  fund  specific  projects  to  improve  the  quality  of
educational  services,  developed by them, according to their particular  needs. To this extent,
the  states would  become  really autonomous-otherwise  decentralization  would be merely
administrative.
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1.  THE EEEP DATA
The Primary Education  Assessment  Survey, second round  1997 (Evaluaci6n de Educaci6n
Primaria, segundo levantamiento 1997),  from the SEP  is representative  of state level  and
by  stratum (urban  {public  and private}  schools;  public rural  schools;  indigenous  schools,
and community schools).  Tables A. 1 and A.2 show the sample sizes by state and stratum.
Table A.1 Number of Students by State and Stratum, Second  Round 1997.
Community  Indigenous  Public rural  Public  Private
State  urban  urban  Total Schools  Schools  school  scol  chl
school  _  school
AGUASCALIENTES  4  452  746  120  1.322
BAJA CALIFORNIA  74  432  842  84  1,432
BAJA CALIFORNIA  SUR  4  386  792  78  1,260
CAMPECHE  9  166  487  707  89  1,458
CHIAPAS  49  125  379  391  92  1,036
CHIHUAHUA  12  37  379  907  100  1,435
COAHUILA  14  718  2,155  732  3,619
COLIMA  444  653  124  1,221
DISTRITO  FEDERAL  3,756  676  4,432
DURANGO  31  197  489  485  88  1,290
EDO.  MEXICO  16  99  433  878  62  1,488
GUANAJUATO  20  483  613  51  1,167
GUERRERO  59  105  643  447  76  1,330
HIDALGO  44  143  488  489  91  1,255
JALISCO  42  289  388  797  108  1,624
MICHOACAN  69  399  384  558  95  1,505
MORELOS  15  48  420  927  64  1,474
NAYARIT  6  14  441  679  81  1,221
NUEVO LEON  6  411  939  104  1,460
OAXACA  34  448  709  516  64  1,771
PUEBLA  20  401  432  473  96  1,422
QUERETARO  18  52  504  500  138  1,212
QUINTANA ROO  5  45  385  809  85  1,329
SAN LUIS POTOSI  35  444  464  497  90  1,530
SINALOA  20  16  415  643  103  1,197
SONORA  2  412  345  773  477  2,009
TABASCO  20  409  544  484  71  1,528
TAMAULIPAS  12  394  787  73  1,266
TLAXCALA  6  533  604  79  1,222
VERACRUZ  45  800  1,867  2,083  66  4,861
YUCATAN  10  400  409  830  74  1,723
ZACATECAS  11  484  517  98  1,110
Total  638  5123  15742  27277  4429  53,209
Source: Primary Education Assessment  Survey, second round SEP, 1997
41Table A.2 Number of Schools  by State and Stratum, Second Round, 1997.
Community  Indigenous  Public rural  Public  Private
State  Scol  col  col  urban  urban  Total Schools  Schools  school  scol  chl
school  school
AGUASCALIENTES  2  25  29  7  63
BAJA CALIFORNIA  4  24  38  5  71
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR  2  46  32  5  85
CAMPECHE  4  24  50  29  4  111
CHIAPAS  21  14  31  18  4  88
CHIHUAHUA  6  3  60  37  5  111
COAHUILA  6  82  89  32  209
COLIMA  32  28  5  65
DISTRITO FEDERAL  157  36  193
DURANGO  18  42  59  21  3  143
EDO. MEXICO  6  4  31  37  6  84.
GUANAJUATO  11  28  26  3  68
GUERRERO  23  8  41  27  4  103
HIDALGO  17  15  41  20  5  98
JALISCO  16  34  48  35  8  141
MICHOACAN  35  27  36  23  4  125
MORELOS  4  2  24  39  5  74
NAYARIT  3  3  37  27  4  74
NUEVO LEON  3  57  41  5  106
OAXACA  16  37  50  22  4  129
PUEBLA  8  33  30  19  6  96
QUERETARO  7  7  31  20  5  70
QUINTANA ROO  2  9  28  35  4  78
SAN LUIS POTOSI  21  51  45  21  5  143
SINALOA  14  2  42  26  4  88
SONORA  2  73  38  34  23  170
TABASCO  8  37  39  20  3  107
TAMAULIPAS  8  38  32  4  82
TLAXCALA  3  26  25  3  57
VERACRUZ  20  81  201  113  4  419
YUCATAN  5  44  30  36  4  119
ZACATECAS  6  44  21  4  75
Total  297  554  1,394  1,177  223  3,645
Source: Primary Education  Assessment Survey, second round. SEP,  1997
42Table A.3  Carrera  Magisterial  Self Selection  Problem
Carrera  Magisterial  self-selection problem.  The probit equation results are as follows,
Probit estimates  Number of  obs  =  22040
Wald chi2(37)  =  2669.65
Prob  > chi2  =  0.0000
Log likelihood =  -11540.659  Pseudo R2  =  0.3724
Robust
carmag  Coef.  Std.  Err.  z  P>(IZ  dF/dX
State  I  All relevant dummies  were  significant
Stratum 2  1  -. 7613951  .0597008  -12.754  0.000  .3706374
Stratum 3  1  -. 1237808  .0312558  -3.960  0.000  .3876072
Classroom size  1  .0130532  .002017  6.472  0.000  .0017506
Teacher gender  (Male=l)l  -. 446673  .0293384  -15.225  0.000  -. 1419307
Teacher age  I  .19615  .011233  17.462  0.000  .0479354
Teacher's Schooling  I  .1297847  .0122191  10.621  0.000  .0313395
Codependents  I  .1178115  .0105022  11.218  0.000  .0291940
Experience in  5th  grade  1  .1043082  .0086326  12.083  0.000  .0431934
Supervisor's visits  I  .1187639  .0119659  9.925  0.000  .0087112
Teacher's opinion of C.M.  .1361276  .0190356  7.151  0.000  .0485315
(The  Trigger Variable)  I
Constant  I  -1.328442  .1141722  -11.635  0.000
43ANNEX B
VARIABLES'  DEFINITIONS
NAME  DEFINITION IN THE  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  SCALE
QUESTIONNAIRE
Mathematics  achievement  Score obtained in the math  The exam scores are re-scaled  0-100
exam, which covers 56"  grade  using the Rash model.
topics.
Spanish achievement  Score obtained in the Spanish  The exam has six parts, reading  0-100
exam, which covers 5* grade  comprehension,  use of graphics,
topics.  writing, language interpretation,
literature,  and writing expression.
The grade is given by the  percents
of correct answers.
Student's gender (male)  Male student  Dummy
Student's age  Student's age  Continuous  10-13
years old
Repetition in fifth grade  Whether the student repeated  Dummy
(yes)  5th grade
Pre-school education (yes)  Whether the student attended  Dummy
preschool
Blurred vision (yes)  Does the student see what is  Dummy
on the blackboard?
Student's attitude towards  Quantitative Indicator of the  Continuous.  This index includes  0-100
learning  student's attitude towards  variables such as time spent on
learning in 5th grade. This  homework,  frequency of research
index was constructed  tasks and homework, and, the use
through principal component  of additional books for
analysis.  assignments.
Household size  Number of family members  Categorical  1-5
Household income  Family income flows  Categorical  1-7
House utilities  Services in house.  Categorical.  Categories were
constructed using availability
indicators of water, drainage,
electricity,  telephone, and
combinations of  these.
Father's schooling level  Student's father schooling  Categorical  0-6
level
44Mother's schooling  level  Student's mother schooling  Categorical  0-6
level
Household head economic  Student's household head  A set of dummies variables.
sector  economic  sector  Economic sectors are defined as
Professional Services,  Agriculture,
Manufacturing,  Commerce,
Handicraft  Sector, and Public
Service  Sector.
Parents involvement in the  Who helps the student do his  Categorical  0-3
student's homework  or her homework?
Parents  meet with the  Meeting with the teacher to  Dummy
teacher (yes)  talk about the student's
learning performance
Parents  meet with the  Meeting with the Director to  Dummy
Director (yes)  talk about the student's
learning performance
Number of books in house  Number of books in house  Categorical  1-6
Amenities or facilities in  House amenities or facilities,  Continuous  0-5
house  which include radio, washing
machine, refrigerator,  gas
stove, and television. It is
assumed that the impact of
each one is the same.
Number of rooms  in house  Number of rooms in house  Continuous  1-5
Parent's expectations of  Index of parent's  Categorical.  This index includes 3  1-3
the student's educational  expectations  of the student's  values: low, medium and high
level achievement  educational  level  expectations.
achievement.
Parent's opinion of  Index of parent's opinion of  Categorical.  This index includes 3  1-3
educational  services in  educational  services in school  values: Non-Favorable, Neutral,
school  and Favorable
Family's standard of living  Family's standard of living  Categorical.  This index includes 3  1-3
index.  values:  low, medium, adequate
standard of living.
Teacher's  age  Teacher's age  Categorical  1-8
Teacher's gender (male)  Teachers gender  Dummy
Teacher's  residence within  Place of Residence (within or  Dummy
the community (yes)  outside the community)
Teacher's years of  Year of residence in the  Categorical  1-6
residence in the  community
community
Teacher's schooling level  Teacher's schooling  Categorical.  This variable includes  1-5
455 values: Lower-secondary,
Preparatory level of teachers
training, 3 years (Normal Basica 3
aflos), Preparatory level of teachers
training, 4 years (Normal Bdsica 4
afios), Tertiary level of teachers
training (Normal Superior), and
Bachelor degree.
Attendance to updating  Attendance to updating  Dummy
courses (yes)  courses
Number of updating  Number of updating courses  Continuous  0-5
courses  taken by the teacher
Teacher's experience  as  Teacher's experience  as  Categorical  1-5
primary teacher  primary teacher
Type of post. Short term  Type of post  Dummy
(yes)
More than one post (yes)  More than one post  Dummy
Teacher's income  Teacher's income  Categorical  1-5
Secondary Occupation  Another activity  Dummy
(yes)
Classroom size  Number of students in the  Categorical  1-6
classroom in fifth grade.
Didactic material available  Didactic material includes  Continuous  0-7
to the teacher  Maps; Biology Tools;
Blackboard Geometry Tools;
Spanish Dictionary;
Reference Books and several
reading material, and so
forth. It is assumed that each
didactic  material has the
same impact on the learning
process.
Teacher's performance  Quantitative  indicator of  Continuous.  This index includes  0-100
index.  teacher's performance in 5th  variables such as teacher's
grade. This index was  pedagogical behavior; teacher's
constructed through principal  interest  in students' learning,
component analysis.  teacher's adaptability given the
learning results, teacher fosters
students to self-learning,  number
of meetings with parents of low
achievement  children, teacher's
ability to plan.
Teacher's pedagogical  If  the student gives the wrong  Categorical  0-3
behavior  answer, What is the teacher's
pedagogical behavior?
46Teacher's  interest in  How frequently  does the  Categorical  0-2
students'  learning.  teacher have talks with his or
her students about learning
improvements  and
difficulties.
Number of supervisor's  Number of supervisor's  visits  Categorical  1-4
visits (as answered by the
teacher)
Number of supervisor's  Number of supervisor's visits  Categorical  0-5
visits (as answered by the
Director)
Teacher's enrollment in  Enrolled  in Carrera  Dummy
Carrera  Magisterial  (yes)  Magisterial
Teacher's years of  Years in Carrera  Magisterial  Categorical  1-5
enrollment in Carrera
Magisterial
Carrera  Magisterial  Level  Level in which the teacher is  Categorical  1-4
enrolled in Carrera
Magisterial
Director's income  Director's  income  Categorical  1-5
Director's age  Director's age  Categorical  1-8
Director's  experience  Director's experience  Categorical
School equipment  The schools have maps,  Continuous  1-7
computers,  scientific models,
television,  videocassette
recorder,  and digital
projector.  It is assumed that
every teaching tool has the
same impact on the learning
process.
47Table B.1  Determinants of Mathematics Achievement  Scores in Fifth Grade in Urban and
Rural Areas
Urban Areas  Rural Areas
Coeff.  SiL  l  Elasticity  Coeff  Level of  Elasticity
Sig.  ~~~~~~~Sig.
Student  Socioeconomic  Variables  0.497  0.000  0.472  0.000
Teacher's gender (male)  -0.375  0.310  -0.003  0.754  0.568  0.0100
Teacher's age  0.350  0.055  0.036  -0.818  0.148  -0.0759
Attendance to updating courses (yes)  0.522  0.401  0.009  -0.933  0.520  -0.0177
Teacher's  residence within the community (yes)  -0.714  0.065  -0.008  1.740  0.129  0.0099
Teacher's years of  residence  in the community (yes)  0.019  0.876  0.002  0.573  0.084  0.0622
Teacher's  schooling level  0.256  0.117  0.019  -0.483  0.246  -0.0365
Teacher's  pedagogical behavior  0.238  0.001  0.005  0.018  0.048  0.0004
Teacher's  interest in  students' learning  0.451  0.035  0.015  0.509  0.032  0.0173
Number of updating courses  0.020  0.698  0.002  0.086  0.043  0.0093
Type of post. Shortterm (yes)  -1.218  0.141  -0.001  5.766  0.040  0.0072
More than one post (yes)  -0.046  0.895  0.000  4.153  0.026  0.0130
Teacher's  income  0.059  0.655  0.004  -0.332  0.277  -0.0235
Didactic  material  available to the teacher  0.013  0.575  0.004  -0.224  0.003  -0.0626
Number of supervisor's visits (as answered by the  5.237  0.000  0.045  dropped
Director)
Teacher's enrollment in Carrera Magisterial (yes)  0.032  0.947  0.000  2.797  0.005  0.0331
Carrera Magisterial  level  -0.302  0.186  -0.006  -0.450  0.400  -0.0068
Correction of self-selection  bias in Carrera Magisterial  -0.420  0.764  -1.295  0.600
Constant  48.219  0.000  56.266  0.000
Source: Author's estimates  based on The Primary Education Assessment Survey, second round, SEP 1997.
Note: Figures in bold are significant at 5 percent.
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